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Abstract
In this paper, we re-examine the properties of two commonly adopted government
reimbursement schemes for pharmaceuticals: reference pricing and fixed percentage
reimbursement. We depart from the previous literature by assuming that the individual
demand is price-sensitive and depends on the copayment rate (i.e., the part paid by each
consumer). We obtain two novel results under reference pricing: first, as the copayment
rate increases, so do pharmaceutical prices; second, this increase in pharmaceutical
prices reduces social welfare. Whilst reference pricing does emerge as a preferable
reimbursement scheme, demand elasticities and the copayment rate interact in complex
ways. This leads (unexpectedly) to the possibility that a higher copayment rate (lower
reimbursement rate) results in higher government expenditure.
Keywords: Copayment rates; pharmaceutical reimbursement schemes
JEL classification: I18; L13
I. Introduction
Purchasing pharmaceuticals is different from purchasing other goods:
demand is often relatively inelastic and, in a large number of countries,
individuals only pay a fraction of the price of the prescription
pharmaceuticals they consume, whilst the government (or other third-party
payers) are responsible for the remainder. Two widely adopted schemes to
determine their relative contributions are fixed percentage reimbursement
(FPR) and reference pricing (RP). Under FPR, the government pays a fixed
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percentage of the pharmaceutical’s price and the patient is responsible for
the remainder (also known as the copayment rate). By contrast, under RP,
within each cluster of pharmaceuticals,1 one is chosen as the “reference”
and the government only pays a fixed fraction of the “reference”
pharmaceutical’s price, even if the consumer buys a more expensive
alternative.2
In the last decades, RP has become a widely used scheme for price
and (public) expenditure control in pharmaceutical markets. It has attracted
significant attention in the literature, and a large consensus has emerged
regarding its merits. Most models in the literature on RP share two
common features: first, they assume pharmaceuticals are differentiated;
second, they typically make the assumption of unit demand (i.e., each
consumer is assumed to purchase exactly one unit of a pharmaceutical
variety or none). Under the assumption of unit demand with full market
coverage (e.g., Brekke et al., 2007), it should not be surprising that social
welfare is equal across reimbursement regimes as there are no quantity
effects. Reimbursement regimes merely determine who captures the surplus
created, but not its amount.
In this paper, our main aim is to analyze the impact of considering
that each individual consumer’s demand depends on prices – a clear
departure from the previous literature, which commonly assumes individual
unit demand – under reimbursement schemes such as FPR and RP,
in a full market coverage setting with differentiated pharmaceuticals.
This strikes us as a realistic assumption, at least for some health
conditions. For instance, in the treatment of health conditions that
result in recurring episodes of symptoms of variable intensity, such as
sleeping disorders, muscular pain, and migraines, pharmaceuticals might
be prescribed during a significant period of time (e.g., under long-
term prescriptions). It is entirely plausible that the patient might react
to the price of the prescribed pharmaceutical when deciding whether
to take it on a specific occasion.3 Even in the treatment of chronic
diseases and conditions, such as hypertension, high cholesterol, and
asthma, treatment adherence has been shown to depend on patients’
1 Several criteria could be used to cluster pharmaceuticals: chemical, pharmacological, and
therapeutic (Miraldo, 2009).
2 Naturally, RP is only viable if more than one pharmaceutical is available for the treatment
of a condition, and it is especially used when low-price generic competition exists. For more
detailed reviews of RP, see López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000) and Galizzi et al. (2011).
3 It is important to note that the most obvious candidate to satisfy this assumption is the
over-the-counter (OTC) market for pharmaceuticals. However, OTC pharmaceuticals are not
subject to prescription and, hence, typically fall outside the scope of reimbursement schemes.
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copayments.4 The health conditions and associated pharmaceuticals
likely to satisfy our assumption are a non-negligible portion of the
pharmaceutical market. For instance, a statin (Pfizer’s Lipitor), which is
used for the treatment of high cholesterol, was the top selling drug in
the United States in 2011 (the year its patent expired), with overall sales
close to nine billion dollars (3 percent of total pharmaceutical expenditure),
and Gibson et al. (2006) report that statin treatment adherence depends
negatively on copayment rates.5 However, our setting might be less
adequate for pharmaceuticals that are used to treat serious non-recurring
conditions, in which case the patient will often be limited to the choices of
either following his physician’s prescription and buying the pharmaceutical,
or not buying it at all. In this case, the framework used by Brekke et al.
(2007) seems more fitting.
We obtain two novel results. First, we find that, under RP, prices
increase with the copayment rate, converging to FPR prices as it approaches
one. This differs from Brekke et al. (2007) and Gonçalves et al. (2015),
who find that, under RP, prices are independent of the copayment rate.6
Second, we find that whilst social welfare under RP is always higher than
under FPR (converging to the latter as the copayment rate approaches one),
it decreases with the copayment rate.
The impact of the elastic demand assumption on RP explains the
differences from the results in the previous literature. In summary, whereas
under FPR an increase in the copayment rate (assuming all else constant)
has no impact on the relative prices faced by the consumer, because all
prices rise by the same percentage, this is not so under RP – an increase
in the copayment rate changes the relative prices in favor of the more
expensive (branded) pharmaceutical and, consequently, increases its market
share. In the face of this, the branded producer takes the opportunity to
raise prices. In equilibrium, the generic price also increases and, thus,
higher copayment rates lead to higher prices.
From the point of view of social welfare, under RP, higher copayment
rates lead to higher prices, lower consumption levels, and higher consumer
pharmaceutical expenditure. In addition, as the copayment rate increases, a
lower fraction of consumers purchase the branded pharmaceutical because
(in equilibrium) its effective price increases relatively more than the
4 Treatment adherence refers to patients taking their medication as prescribed – quantity and
frequency. See Lexchin and Grootendorst (2004), Tseng et al. (2004), Gibson et al. (2005),
Goldman et al. (2007), and Eaddy et al. (2012), among others.
5 Another statin, Crestor, ranked seventh, with a total expenditure of close to five billion
dollars in 2011 (information retrieved from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey http://
meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data stats/summ tables/hc/drugs/2011/hcdrugest totexp2011.shtml).
6 In Brekke et al. (2007), this is true only for therapeutical reference pricing – the setting
that is directly comparable to ours – but not for generic reference pricing.
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generic. These two factors contribute to a reduction in social welfare. This
is in stark contrast with the case of inelastic demand, where an increase
in the copayment rate is effectively a welfare-neutral transfer between
the government and consumers (the former spends less in pharmaceutical
reimbursement, to the detriment of the latter who must now bear a higher
copayment).
From the point of view of policy, two main conclusions emerge. First,
from a social welfare perspective, RP is preferable to FPR. Second, under
RP, an increase in the copayment rate might not necessarily lead to a
decrease in government expenditure – for low copayment rates and high
elasticities, an increase in the copayment rate leads to a price rise that
more than compensates the decrease in the quantity consumed and in the
reimbursement rate.
Our results are driven by the combined assumptions of vertical
differentiation between branded and generic pharmaceuticals and elastic
demand at the individual consumer’s level. Vertical differentiation is not
unusual in models of the pharmaceuticals market (e.g., Merino-Castelló,
2003; Brekke et al., 2011), although some authors use horizontal
differentiation (e.g., Miraldo, 2009) and others combine horizontal and
vertical differentiation (e.g., Brekke et al., 2007). By contrast, the elastic
demand of an individual consumer is novel: the extant literature assumes
unit demand at the individual consumer level, even if this could result in
elastic aggregate demand when the assumption of full market coverage is
relaxed (e.g., Merino-Castelló, 2003; Miraldo, 2009; Brekke et al., 2011).
In spite of these differences, our model confirms that RP is associated
with enhanced price competition, as also shown by Merino-Castelló (2003)
and Brekke et al. (2007), among others.7
The paper has the following structure. In Section II, we describe the
model. In Sections III and IV, we discuss our results and their welfare
implications, respectively. We conclude in Section V. An Appendix contains
a detailed derivation of our results and additional useful graphics. An
Online Appendix is available as supporting material.
II. Model
Our model is loosely inspired by Rath and Zhao (2001) and Gu and
Wenzel (2009). Consumers are assumed to buy a Hicksian composite
good (denoted by h) and a differentiated pharmaceutical that exists in
two varieties – branded (b) and generic (g) – each of which is produced
7 In addition, Brekke et al. (2009, 2011) present empirical evidence of significant price
reductions for all pharmaceuticals following the introduction of RP in Norway.
© The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2016.
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by a different firm. We further assume that these two firms compete by
simultaneously setting prices.
As in Hanemann (1984), consumers’ decisions involve both a qualitative
or discrete choice (“which pharmaceutical variety, branded or generic, to
consume”) as well as a continuous choice (“how many units of the chosen
pharmaceutical variety to consume”). Suppose that a consumer of type c
has decided to consume only variety i ∈{b, g}. Given this decision, as in
Gu and Wenzel (2009), we assume that his conditional direct utility from
consuming qh units of the Hicksian good and qi units of the differentiated
pharmaceutical is
ū(qh, qi, c) = qh − "1− "q
("−1)/"
i − fi (c), (1)
where fi (c) is a consumer-specific disutility parameter discussed in more
detail below. This utility function leads to isoelastic demand functions for
the differentiated pharmaceutical, where the (absolute value of the) demand
elasticity is equal to ". Note that the conditional direct utility function
increases with the consumption of the differentiated pharmaceutical, as
increased consumption reduces a negative element (assuming " < 1) that
can be interpreted as “disease” or “discomfort”.8
We also assume that consumers differ in the degree to which they
distrust the generic pharmaceutical to be therapeutically equivalent to the
branded product. This seems plausible not only among the general public
but also among trained physicians. Kesselheim et al. (2008, p. 2514) note
that generics “[…] may differ in peripheral features, such as pill color or
shape, inert binders and fillers, and the specific manufacturing process”.
However, “[s]ome physicians and patients have expressed concern that
bioequivalent generic and brand-name drugs may not be equivalent in their
effects on various clinical parameters, including physiological measures
such as heart rate or blood pressure, important laboratory measurements,
and outcomes such as health system utilization or mortality” (Kesselheim
et al., 2008, p. 2515). The scientific debate on whether bioequivalence
translates on to treatment effect equivalence is still ongoing, but at the
very least suggests that it is plausible and possibly rational for a consumer
to suspect that a generic drug might not have the same treatment effect
as the branded drug.9 In this context, parameter fi (c) in the conditional
8 In addition, the marginal utility of consumption of the chosen differentiated pharmaceutical is
decreasing (i.e., increasing consumption levels contribute gradually less towards the treatment
of the underlying health condition).
9 Kesselheim et al. (2008) conclude, in their meta-analysis of various studies, that generics and
branded drugs have similar clinical outcomes in the treatment of cardiovascular diseases; by
contrast, Borgherini (2003) reaches an opposite conclusion for psychoactive drugs. Kobayashi
et al. (2011) discuss evidence from various countries (United States, Spain, Portugal, Germany,
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utility function measures the utility loss consumers suffer by buying
a drug they trust less than the branded pharmaceutical. By definition,
fb (c)=0, as the branded pharmaceutical is the benchmark against which
trust is measured. As for consumers who buy the generic drug, we assume
fg(c)= tc. The parameter c∈ [0, 1] measures the “level of distrust” and is
consumer-specific – effectively the consumer type – and we assume it
to be uniformly distributed in the [0, 1] interval.10 The parameter t > 0
measures the negative impact of this distrust on the consumer’s conditional
utility.
Maximizing the conditional direct utility subject to the consumer’s
budget constraint p̂iqi +phqh =m (where p̂i and ph represent the prices of
the differentiated pharmaceutical and Hicksian good, respectively, and m
represents the consumer’s income), and normalizing ph =1, the associated
conditional demand functions are given by





In this context, consumer c ∈ [0, 1] obtains the following conditional
indirect utility from consuming pharmaceutical variety i:





p̂1−"i − fi (c).
We implicitly assume that each type of consumer purchases branded
or generic pharmaceuticals, but not both simultaneously; in effect,
consumers compare the maximum conditional utility they can obtain
(given their budget constraint) by consuming (a certain quantity of) each
pharmaceutical variety, and they choose whichever yields the highest
conditional utility.
Both the choice between the generic and branded products as well as
the quantities consumed depend on the prices charged to the consumer,
and Norway) where consumers were (or are) skeptical about the effectiveness and safety of
generic drugs. In a study on the underlying reasons for generic underuse in Portugal, Quintal
and Mendes (2011) find that over 40 percent of respondents justify it because of their “lack
of trust” in generics.
10 Intuitively, we can interpret the model as one of vertical differentiation: the [0, 1] interval
is a scale that measures the subjective perceived vertical differentiation between the branded
pharmaceutical and the generic. Note also that we assume this disutility to be independent
of the quantity consumed (i.e., lump sum), in a similar way to Gu and Wenzel (2009). In effect,
this is equivalent to assuming a (fixed) consumer-specific distrust in the generic treatment
effectiveness, which does not depend on the quantity the consumer decides to consume, and
which only affects the discrete choice of the drug variety to purchase (branded or generic).
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and these depend on the reimbursement scheme in place. We analyze two
reimbursement schemes: an FPR scheme (henceforth represented by the
superscript “F”), in which consumers pay the same percentage (copayment
rate), ∈ [0, 1], of their desired product’s headline price (the headline price
being the price set by the producer); and an RP scheme (henceforth
represented by the superscript “R”), where the consumer’s copayment is
based on the price of the reference pharmaceutical, which we assume
to be the generic because it is cheaper and hence leads to a lower
reimbursement expenditure. Under RP, consumers must pay a percentage
(copayment rate) of the reference pharmaceutical’s price if they choose
to purchase it, but if they choose to purchase the branded pharmaceutical
they must pay in full the price difference with respect to the reference
price.
Under FPR, effective prices (i.e., the prices effectively paid by the
consumer) are given by
p̂Fi = pFi −
(
1−)pFi = pFi , i = b, g, (3)
where we define pFi , i ∈ {b, g}, to be the headline prices set by firms
under FPR. By contrast, under RP (assuming the copayment rate  is
similar across schemes), effective prices are given by
p̂Rb = pRb −
(
1−)pRg ,
p̂Rg = pRg −
(
1−)pRg = pRg , (4)
where pRi , i ∈ {b, g}, are the headline prices set by firms when the RP
scheme is in place.
We also refer to the no reimbursement (NR) scenario, where patients
must support the headline prices in full; this is equivalent to setting =1
in equations (3) or (4).11 Finally, production costs are assumed to be zero
for both producers.12
11 This would generally be the relevant scenario for OTC pharmaceuticals.
12 Brekke et al. (2007) and Miraldo (2009) also assume zero marginal production costs, whilst
Brekke et al. (2011) assume a positive marginal production cost. We make the assumption that
production costs are negligible and equal across producers, as there is no reason to assume
a cost advantage in favor of any of them. As suggested by an anonymous referee, we have
solved the model under positive production costs. Unfortunately, this introduces significant
complexity in the analysis, and there are no closed-form solutions under both FPR and RP.
Nevertheless, we have conducted several simulations, which indicate that all our results hold
for a sufficiently small production cost.
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III. Pricing
Fixed Percentage Reimbursement













These results are in line with those of Brekke et al. (2007), Rodrigues
et al. (2014), and Gonçalves et al. (2015).14 Note that pFi = (1/)pNRi , with
i ∈{b, g}. Under FPR, firms mark up their headline prices in an inversely
proportional manner relative to the copayment rate; that is, the higher
the copayment rate, the lower the mark-up is. Thus, headline prices, pFb
and pFg , are lowest when the patient’s copayment rate is maximal (=1).
Effective prices are equal in both cases and therefore equilibrium quantities
are also the same: p̂Fi = p̂NRi (i ∈ {b, g}). Under FPR, an increase in the
copayment rate  would lead, ceteris paribus (i.e., assuming no change
in headline prices), to an increase in effective prices, therefore reducing
the quantity consumed of both the branded and generic pharmaceuticals.
In this context, both firms find it profit-maximizing to reduce headline
prices and, thus, to reduce the (negative) impact on demand. It turns out
that, in equilibrium, this reduction is sufficient for effective prices not to
change and, thus, for individually consumed quantities and overall sold
quantities of both goods to remain constant.
Inevitably, this hurts the profits of both firms. As mentioned earlier,
this result is similar to that of Brekke et al. (2007) – in the case of no
reference pricing, which is equivalent to our FPR setting. An increase in
the copayment rate leads to a reduction in total pharmaceutical expenditure
(which is equal to profits) and, consequently, to a reduction in government
expenditure, but consumer surplus remains unchanged.15 From a different
point of view, reimbursement through FPR can be seen as a public subsidy
that ultimately benefits firms.
13 More detail regarding the derivation of these results is provided in the Appendix.
14 In particular, when "=0 (inelastic demand), pFb |"=0 =2t/ 3, pFg |"=0 = t/ 3, and the individual
quantity purchased by each consumer is equal to one unit.
15 Profit levels (which are equal to total pharmaceutical expenditure) thus become Fi =
(1/)NRi , i ∈{b, g} (i.e., firms also increase their profits in an inversely proportional manner
relative to the copayment rate). Also, note that consumer surplus CS does not depend on ;
as outlined above, the copayment rate has no impact on the effective prices that consumers
must face, p̂Fb and p̂
F
g . Hence, the existence of an FPR scheme (through parameter ) does
not affect consumer surplus (i.e., CSF =CSNR).
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Reference Pricing
Under RP, effective prices are given by equation (4). As the Appendix
shows in more detail, the profit maximization’s first-order conditions cannot
be solved analytically and, hence, no closed-form solution exists for
equilibrium prices, except when "=1/ 2. Therefore, we have adopted the
following strategy. First, we solve the model and obtain equilibrium prices
for "= 1/ 2. Then, we use simulations to confirm the robustness of our
results for different values of " (see the Online Appendix).
When "=1/ 2, the (Nash) equilibrium headline prices are given by








It is particularly relevant to highlight the following (novel) result (we
defer a more careful interpretation of the underlying rationale to the end
of this section).
Proposition 1. With " = 1/ 2 under an RP scheme, both headline and
effective equilibrium prices increase with the copayment rate.
Proof: In equilibrium, under an RP scheme with "=1/ 2, headline prices










4(1+21/ 2)3 . (7)
Both derivatives are positive for any t > 0 and  ∈ [0, 1]. Effective
equilibrium prices are easily calculated using equations (4) and (6), yielding
p̂Rb |"=1/ 2 = (1+1/ 2)2t2/ 4(1+21/ 2)2 and p̂Rg |"=1/ 2 =2t2/ 4(1+21/ 2)2. The










2(1+21/ 2)3 . (8)
Again, both derivatives are positive for any t > 0 and ∈ [0, 1]. 
When we compare these equilibrium prices with those obtained under
an FPR scheme, we also obtain the following result.
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Proposition 2. With " = 1/ 2, both headline and effective equilibrium
prices under an RP scheme are never higher than under an FPR
scheme.
Proof: RP equilibrium prices with " = 1/ 2 are given by equation (6).
By evaluating FPR equilibrium prices (equation (5)) when " = 1/ 2, we
obtain








It is easily shown that pFi |"=1/ 2 >pRi |"=1/ 2 for any ∈ [0, 1) and pFi |"=1/ 2 =
pRi |"=1/ 2 when =1, i ∈{b, g}.
Effective equilibrium prices under FPR (when " = 1/ 2) are easily
calculated using equations (3) and (5): p̂Fb |"=1/ 2 = 4t2/ 9 and p̂Fg |"=1/ 2 = t2/ 9.
Effective equilibrium prices under RP (when " = 1/ 2) are given above
(see the proof of Proposition 1). It is now straightforward to show that
p̂Fi |"=1/ 2 > p̂Ri |"=1/ 2 for any  ∈ [0, 1) and p̂Fi |"=1/ 2 = p̂Ri |"=1/ 2 when  = 1,
i ∈{b, g}. 
Proposition 1 shows that headline prices under RP increase with .
This contrasts with the case of "=0 (inelastic demand), where headline
prices do not depend on : pRb |"=0 =2t/ 3 and pRg |"=0 = t/ 3 (effective prices,
however, increase with ). When "> 0, an increase in  (ceteris paribus)
leads to an increase in both effective prices by the same amount. However,
because it is lower in absolute terms, the effective price of the generic
increases by more than the effective price of the branded pharmaceutical in
percentage terms. The branded product becomes relatively less expensive,
thus attracting some of the consumers that were previously buying the
generic. That is, a lower fraction cR of consumers will purchase the
generic – and a higher fraction will purchase the branded pharmaceutical
(see equation (A12) in the Appendix). Therefore, although an increase
in  reduces the quantity demanded of both the branded and generic
pharmaceuticals by each individual consumer, it leads to a decrease
(increase) in the overall quantity demanded of the generic (branded)
pharmaceutical because some consumers switch from the generic to the
branded pharmaceutical (see equation (A21) in the Appendix).
In this context, the branded producer finds it profit-maximizing to
respond to the increase in the copayment rate with an increase in its
headline price. In equilibrium, the generic producer does the same, and the
increase in the copayment rate – coupled with the increase in
headline prices – unequivocally increases effective prices and reduces
© The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2016.
R. Gonçalves and V. Rodrigues 169
individually consumed quantities, as well as overall demand for both
pharmaceuticals.16
Headline prices under FPR decrease with  whilst under an RP scheme
they increase, but the latter are always lower than (or equal to, when
=1) the former for a given value of ", as suggested by Proposition 2
(in the case of " = 1/ 2).17 Because headline and effective prices are
higher under FPR (except for =1, in which case they are equal), this
suggests that RP is more effective in bringing about price competition than
FPR, to the benefit of consumers. This result is in line with that of the
existing literature (Merino-Castelló, 2003; Brekke et al., 2007, 2011). In
particular, as pointed out by Brekke et al. (2011), compared to FPR and
for given prices, RP makes the branded pharmaceutical more expensive
for consumers (as the part of the price that is subject to reimbursement is
lower). The generic producer enhances this effect by lowering its headline
prices and, thus, the reference price itself; this clearly benefits consumers
as it allows them to increase their consumption levels.
Government expenditure under RP depends on both " and . In
particular, as the copayment rate  increases, thus contributing to lower
expenditure, the headline generic price (i.e., the reference price for
reimbursement) increases, thus contributing to higher expenditure. However,
demand for both the branded and generic pharmaceuticals decreases, thus
contributing to lower expenditure. Therefore, the net effect of changes in
 on government expenditure depends on the magnitudes of these effects,
whereas under FPR higher copayment rates unambiguously reduce
expenditure. Figure 1 shows that government expenditure is higher for
lower values of ", because the reference price is higher. Government
expenditure approaches 0 as the copayment rate  tends to 1 and –
depending on the value of " – it can (as in the case of FPR) decrease
with  (when " < 1/ 2) or it can exhibit an increasing segment (for low
values of ) and a decreasing segment (for high values of ) in its
relationship with  (when " 1/ 2). This is particularly relevant from a
policy point of view, because it suggests that an increase in the copayment
rate might not always succeed in reducing government expenditure.
16 Brekke et al. (2011) obtain a different result. They find that headline prices decrease with the
copayment rate, but we must be cautious in interpreting this difference. Indeed, their model
is different from ours in more than one dimension: they assume unit demand (whilst we
assume elastic demand), and they also assume that the market is not fully covered (whilst we
assume full market coverage). In our model, under RP, an increase in  works to the branded
producer’s advantage, as this allows it to raise headline prices and profits. By contrast, the
generic producer’s profits can increase or decrease with , and this depends on the particular
value of ". For the generic producer, the net effect on profits depends on the balance between
higher headline (and effective) prices and lower demand.
17 This is also true in the case of "=0 (inelastic demand), a result similar to that of Brekke
et al. (2007).
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Fig. 1. Government expenditure under RP for various values of ", with t =2/ 3
For a given elasticity, the price differences across schemes become lower
as the copayment rate increases. However, for a given copayment rate,
higher elasticity values result in lower (absolute) price differences between
FPR and RP, but the relative difference (in percentage terms) actually
increases. This shows that higher demand elasticities reinforce the merit of
RP with regards to FPR, as can be seen in Figure A1 (see the Appendix).
IV. Welfare Analysis
We now turn our attention to the welfare implications of our results.
Following the approach outlined in Section III, we analyze the case of
"=1/ 2; however, simulations show that results are robust to other values
of " (see the Online Appendix). We focus on social welfare (SW), which is
the sum of consumer and producer surplus minus government expenditure
with pharmaceuticals. We show the following.
Proposition 3. When " = 1/ 2, social welfare under RP is decreasing
with the copayment rate.
Proof: Assuming "=1/ 2, under an RP scheme social welfare is given
by SW R|"=1/ 2 = CSR|"=1/ 2 + R|"=1/ 2 − GR|"=1/ 2. Using equations (A23),
(A24), and (A25), we obtain
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SW R|"=1/ 2 = m− (3+
1/ 2 +23/ 2) t
2(1+21/ 2)2 . (10)
The derivative of this expression with respect to  is unambiguously




1/ 2 +6+43/ 2) t
41/ 2(1+21/ 2)3 . (11)

Proposition 4. When "= 1/ 2, social welfare under RP is never lower
than under FPR.
Proof: Under FPR, social welfare is given by SW F |"=1/ 2 = CSF |"=1/ 2 +
F |"=1/ 2 − GF |"=1/ 2. Using the expressions in equations (A8) (A9), and
(A10) evaluated at "=1/ 2, we obtain
SW F |"=1/ 2 = m− t3 . (12)
Using this equation, as well as equation (10), the difference between
social welfare under the two reimbursement schemes is given by
SW F |"=1/ 2 −SW R|"=1/ 2 = (−2−5
1/ 2 ++63/ 2) t
6(1+21/ 2)2 . (13)
The denominator is always positive and t is also assumed to be strictly
positive. Therefore, the sign of this expression depends on the sign of
the non-linear function in the numerator, which is negative for ∀∈ [0, 1)
(in which case SW F |"=1/ 2 < SW R|"=1/ 2) and equal to zero when =1 (in
which case SW F |"=1/ 2 = SW R|"=1/ 2). 
In order to understand the rationale underlying Propositions 3 and 4, it
is helpful to break down social welfare using only the main components:
the location of the indifferent consumer, (effective) prices, and quantities.
This yields








i + p̂igGi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expenditure
, i =F , R. (14)
When  = 1, we have already seen that cF = cR and all prices and
quantities are equal across reimbursement regimes (i.e., pFb = pRb , p̂Fb =
p̂Rb , B
F = BR, and GF = GB). Therefore, SW F = SW R. Under RP, as 
decreases, Proposition 1 shows that effective prices decrease as well. The
equilibrium location of the indifferent consumer cR will also decrease;
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that is, the reduction in the branded (effective) price is more significant
than the reduction in the generic (effective) price, and a higher fraction
of consumers will purchase the branded pharmaceutical. Therefore, the
“transport cost” term in equation (14) becomes smaller and social welfare
increases. At the same time, the equilibrium reduction in both effective
prices will lead to an increase in the total quantity consumed of both
pharmaceuticals, BR and GR. The price effect dominates and total consumer
pharmaceutical expenditure – the “expenditure” term in equation (14) –
decreases, thus also increasing social welfare. For low elasticities (0 <"<
1/ 2) under RP, as  decreases, social welfare increases as does generic
penetration (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). In addition, for a given
 and for low elasticities (0 < " < 1/ 2), generic penetration is higher
under RP than under FPR. Usually, policies that aim to increase welfare
encompass increased generic penetration, which in our model is true for
low elasticities.18 Note, in particular, the contrast with the case of inelastic
demand ("=0). In that case, the “expenditure” term in equation (14) is
equal to zero, the “transport cost” term does not depend on  and social
welfare is, therefore, invariant to changes in .
In addition, note that social welfare under FPR is constant: neither
the “transport cost” term nor the “expenditure” term in equation (14)
are sensitive to changes in . FPR is a public subsidy to consumers,
so that effective prices are lower than headline prices. However, as we
have argued earlier, under FPR, it is pharmaceutical firms that effectively
profit from this public subsidy, because consumers do not benefit from
lower (effective) prices: the mark-up of headline prices (proportional to
the reimbursement rate) is fully borne by the government, and hence this
transfer is neutral from a social welfare perspective. From a policy point
of view, this result clearly indicates the need for pharmaceutical price
regulation prior to the adoption of an FPR scheme.
Proposition 4 shows that social welfare under RP is always higher than
under FPR (except when =1, when they are equal). As  becomes lower
than one, social welfare under FPR does not change whilst social welfare
under RP increases; this is the underlying rationale for Proposition 4.
Therefore, from a policy point of view, this confirms the welfare merits
of RP when compared with FPR, a result that eluded Brekke et al.
(2007) because of their (inelastic demand) modelling assumptions (see
18 Also, the model was constructed with a view towards introducing price-sensitivity in demand.
In particular, in the treatment of some health conditions that require prolonged treatments,
treatment adherence – which has been shown to depend on patients’ copayments – is not full
(i.e., copayments might be a hindering factor in the purchase of pharmaceuticals). Under those
circumstances, policies that help to reduce effective prices can enhance treatment adherence
(effectively increasing consumption), and can ultimately result in higher social welfare. We
thank a referee for this interpretation of our results.
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Proposition 6 of Brekke et al., 2007). This can be seen when we look
at the case of "=0 (inelastic demand) – we obtain the result of Brekke
et al. (2007) that social welfare levels under FPR and RP are equal for
any .
V. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we study the properties of two commonly adopted
reimbursement schemes, FPR and RP, in a setting in which consumers’
individual demands can be price-elastic. The elastic demand assumption
uncovers novel results under RP, as higher copayment rates lead to higher
prices. In addition, social welfare under RP is shown to decrease as the
copayment rate increases, converging to FPR social welfare levels as the
copayment rate approaches one. Therefore, it is a particularly advantageous
reimbursement scheme (compared to FPR) for low copayment rates (high
reimbursement rates).
On the theoretical side, we note that some of our results deviate from
the extant literature. Particularly, our conclusion – that, under RP, prices
are increasing in the copayment rate – differs from Brekke et al. (2007)
and Gonçalves et al. (2015), who find that prices are independent of the
copayment rate, and from Brekke et al. (2011), who conclude that they
are decreasing in the same variable. These models are built on different
assumptions, and further work seems necessary to reconcile them and
to fully characterize the conditions under which each of the possibilities
holds.
Our results under RP are amenable to empirical testing, along the
following lines. First, the impact of the copayment rate increases on
headline prices is (in absolute terms) decreasing with the elasticity of
demand. Second, depending on the elasticity of demand, the copayment
rate might not have a monotonic relation with government expenditure.
Third, depending on the elasticity of demand, the branded producer’s
market share can increase or decrease with the copayment rate.
An important question is whether our results hold for conditional direct
utility and demand functions different from the ones we consider. Although
many alternative set-ups are possible, we have solved the model assuming
the specification of Rath and Zao (2001), which yields linear demand
functions, and we have obtained similar results (for some parameter
values).19 It might be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a third possible
and, to the best of our knowledge, as yet under-researched, reimbursement
scheme: asymmetric fixed percentage reimbursement, through which the
reimbursement rates are different for different types of pharmaceuticals,
19 See the Online Appendix for more details.
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with generics typically attracting higher reimbursement (lower copayment)
rates.20 Whilst this type of scheme introduces more complexity in the
analysis, it might also have the merit to uncover more intricate details of
firms’ pricing incentives. Moreover, a consideration of generic competition
(as in Ghislandi, 2011) and/or different forms of competition between
the branded and generic producer(s) (e.g., Stackelberg or Cournot) might
also allow for a better understanding of pricing incentives under each
reimbursement scheme. These are likely to be the next steps in our
research.
Appendix: Detailed Pricing Calculations and Graphics
Fixed Percentage Reimbursement
Under FPR, the effective prices for the branded and generic drugs are
given by p̂Fb =pFb and p̂Fg =pFg , respectively. The marginal consumer cF ,
who is indifferent between buying the branded b or generic g
pharmaceuticals, is found by solving v̄b(p̂b, m, c)= v̄g(p̂g , m, c), where v̄i(·)
are the conditional indirect utility functions. This yields
cF = 
1−"[(pFb )
1−" − (pFg )1−"]
(1− ") t . (A1)
As consumers are assumed to form a unit mass, cF gives us the fraction
of consumers purchasing the generic variety and (1− cF ) is the fraction
of consumers purchasing the branded pharmaceutical. Consumers in the
[0, cF ] interval choose to purchase q̄Fg =1/ (p̂Fg )" units of the generic drug,
whilst consumers in the [cF , 1] interval choose to purchase q̄Fb =1/ (p̂Fb ) "
units of the branded drug (q̄i(·), i ∈ {b, g} are the conditional demand
functions). Let pF = (pFb , pFg ) represent the price vector. Using equation
(3), the demand functions are thus given by















1−" − (pFg )1−"]
(1− ") t . (A2)
The profit functions are given by b(pF ) = pFb B(pF ) and g(pF ) =
pFg G(p
F ) for the branded and generic producers, respectively. Maximizing
20 This type of scheme has been used, for instance, in Portugal in order to help increase
generic penetration at an early development stage.
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these functions with respect to pFb and p
F




























































At the equilibrium prices, cF = 1/ 3. This implies that whilst each
individual consumer purchases more units of the generic drug than of
the branded drug (as can be seen in equation (A6), noting that " < 1 by
assumption), the branded drug is sold to a larger fraction of consumers.












(1− ") t. (A7)
Consumer surplus CS is given by the sum of the surplus of buying
the generic and branded pharmaceuticals (in equilibrium, cF =1/ 3):
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Total profits, which are equivalent to total pharmaceutical expenditure,
are given by





(1− ") t. (A9)
Expenditure on pharmaceuticals by the government (or other third-party
payers) is a proportion (1−) of total pharmaceutical expenditure:




(1− ") t. (A10)
Reference Pricing
Under an RP scheme, the effective prices for the branded and generic
drugs are p̂Rb = pRb − (1 − )pRg and p̂Rg = pRg , respectively (see equation
(4)), and the marginal consumer cR, who is indifferent between buying
the branded (b) or generic (g) pharmaceuticals, is again found by solving




1−" − (p̂Rg )1−"
(1− ") t =
[pRb − (1−)pRg ]1−" − (pRg )1−"
(1− ") t . (A11)
Note that assuming constant headline prices (pRb and p
R














Similarly to the FPR case, cR gives us the fraction of consumers
purchasing the generic drug under RP. Each consumer in the [0, cR]
interval chooses to purchase q̄Rg =1/ (p̂Rg )" units of the generic drug, whilst
consumers in the [cR, 1] interval choose to purchase q̄Rb =1/ (p̂Rb )" units of
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the branded drug. Let pR = (pRb , pRg ) represent the price vector. The demand
functions are thus given by B(pR)= q̄Rb (1−cR) for the branded drug, and
by G(pR)= q̄Rg cR for the generic drug. The profit functions are given by
b(pR) = pRb B(pR) and g(pR) = pRg G(pR). When we maximize the latter













Maximizing the branded producer’s profit function with respect to pRb





(1− ") t(p̂Rb )"
×
{













These first-order conditions cannot be solved analytically and, hence, no
closed-form solution exists for equilibrium prices, except in the case of
"=1/ 2. When "=1/ 2, the generic producer’s first-order condition (after





= 0⇔pRb −2(1−)pRg −21/ 2(pRg )1/ 2
× [pRb − (1−)pRg ]1/ 2 =0. (A15)
This non-linear equation has two solutions, but one results in pRb < p
R
g
whenever  > 1/ 4. This violates the assumption that the generic drug is
the reference pharmaceutical because it is cheaper, and hence the generic
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= 0⇔{tpRb −2t(1−)pRg −4[pRb − (1−)pRg ]3/ 2
+21/ 2pRb (pRg )1/ 2 −41/ 2(1−)(pRg )3/ 2
}
×{2t[pRb − (1−)pRg ]3/ 2}−1 =0. (A17)
Substituting the generic producer’s best-response function (equation
(A16)) into this equation, we obtain the branded producer’s Nash
equilibrium price. Subsequently, we substitute it into equation (A16) and
thus we also obtain the generic producer’s equilibrium price:








Under RP, the equilibrium individually consumed quantities are thus
given by
q̄Rb |"=1/ 2 =
2(1+21/ 2)
(+1/ 2) t ,




whilst overall quantities sold are given by








At the equilibrium prices, cR|"=1/ 2 =1/ 2/ (1+21/ 2)1/ 3, ∀∈ [0, 1] (in
particular, cR|"=1/ 2 is an increasing function of ). This implies that, as
under the FPR scheme, whilst each individual consumer purchases more
units of the generic drug than of the branded drug, the latter is sold to
a larger fraction of consumers.
Note that assuming constant headline prices (pRb and p
R
























(pRg −pRb ) < 0. (A21)
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Under an RP scheme with "=1/ 2, equilibrium profits are
Rb |"=1/ 2 =
1/ 2(1+1/ 2) t
(1+21/ 2)2 ,
Rg |"=1/ 2 =
1/ 2t
2(1+21/ 2)2 . (A22)
Consumer surplus CS is given by the sum of the surplus of buying
the generic and branded pharmaceuticals, which for " = 1/ 2 yields (in
equilibrium, cR|"=1/ 2 =1/ 2/ (1+21/ 2)):
CSR|"=1/ 2 =




g |"=1/ 2, m, c)dc
+
∫ 1
1/ 2/ (1+21/ 2)
v̄b(p̂
R
b |"=1/ 2, m, c)dc
=





g |"=1/ 2, m)−
"
1− "










b |"=1/ 2, m)−
"
1− "





5+21/ 2 +43/ 2) t
2
(
1+21/ 2)2 . (A23)
Note that consumer surplus under RP (with "=1/ 2) is decreasing with
. This is to be expected because effective prices are increasing with 
(Proposition 1). When "=1/ 2, total profits, which are equivalent to total
pharmaceutical expenditure, are an increasing function of  given by
R|"=1/ 2 = Rb |"=1/ 2 +Rg |"=1/ 2 =
(31/ 2 +2) t
2(1+21/ 2)2 . (A24)
Expenditure on pharmaceuticals by the government (or other third-party
payers) is equivalent to the reimbursement rate (1−) multiplied by the
reference price (which we assume to be the generic price pRg |"=1/ 2) – giving
us the reimbursement amount per unit purchased – further multiplied by
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the total quantity sold. In the case of "=1/ 2, this leads to
GR|"=1/ 2 = (1−)(BR|"=1/ 2 +GR|"=1/ 2)pRg |"=1/ 2 =
(1/ 2 −3/ 2) t


































Fig. A1. Absolute (left) and relative (right) price differences pb between FPR and RP
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Fig. A2. Branded pharmaceutical market share BR/ (BR + GR) under RP for various
values of ", with t =2/ 3
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Merino-Castelló, A. (2003), Impact of the Reference Pricing System on the Pharmaceutical
Market: A Theoretical Approach, Universität Pompeu Fabra Working Paper 524a.
Miraldo, M. (2009), Reference Pricing and Firms’ Pricing Strategies, Journal of Health
Economics 28, 176–197.
Quintal, C. and Mendes, P. (2011), Underuse of Generic Medicines in Portugal: An Empirical
Study on the Perceptions and Attitudes of Patients and Pharmacists, Health Policy 104,
61–68.
Rath, K. P. and Zhao, G. (2001), Two Stage Equilibrium and Product Choice with Elastic
Demand, International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 1441–1455.
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